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Thepolitical revolution that overthrew the monarchy in 1952 was of little im-
mediate consequence for the Egyptian economy. Land reforms resulted in
some redistribution of land and wealth, but the economy continued to be
based on private enterprise. As before, quantitative regulations remained
directed mainly toward foreign trade and payments, and were largely of the
type introduced by many other less developed countries as temporary emer-
gency measures, to be abolished whenever circumstances permitted. It is al-
ways difficult to identify precisely what the policy objectives are in such
transitional periods, but at least until the Suez War of 1956 there was
nothing to indicate that the economy would not continue on a private enter-
prise basis.
By the end of the fifties government attitudes had shifted in favor of
public participation in and direct regulation of the economy, and in 1961
sweeping nationalization measures brought most big business and virtually
all foreign trade into the hands of the state. The ideals of private enterprise
and free trade were now replaced by those of Arab socialism. In practice,
that meant a mixed economy with a large public sector (which included all
foreign trade) and with the remaining private economic activities subject to
various kinds of direct controls. Prices were regulated for purposes of income
distribution and stabilization, and resource allocation in important fields be-
came a matter of administrative decision.
This metamorphosis is described in some detail in Chapter 1. It has the
important consequence for our study that the exchange regimes after 1961
have to be appraised as an integral part of the general control system, whileINTRODUCTION
their impact on the pre-1961 period has to be analyzed on the basis of the
regimes in conjunction with the accompanying aggregative economic policies.
The shift in emphasis is related also to a change in the role of prices. In a
private enterprise economy the impact of a foreign exchange regime can be
gauged through the price distortion it causes, assuming that private producers
adjust to the distorted prices. Under extensive price control, domestic market
prices will no longer exclusively reflect the exchange regime, and with a large
public sector where investment decisions are made by the government, as well
as direct intervention in production decisions in both public and private sectors,
the allocation of resources will not reflect domestic market prices, either. A
system that deliberately intervenes in resource allocation through direct com-
mands may conceivably attain efficiency in production and investment—or
create even more inefficiency than would follow from the given exchange
regimes under a market system. -
Problemsof this nature compelled us to supplement the investigation of
exchange regimes and trade controls with a rather detailed study of govern-
ment decisions regarding industrial and agricultural investment and produc-
tion to gauge directly the degree of efficiency or inefficiency in these areas.
As a consequence, we have found it appropriate to divide the monograph into
three parts. Part One describes the exchange regimes from World War 11
until the end of the sixties and examines their effects at an aggregate level;
Part Two analyzes cropping patterns in agriculture during the sixties; and Part
Three studies the investment and production developments in ten manufactur-
ing industries during the fifties and sixties. -
FromWorld War II until 1961 Egypt was the happy owner of very
substantial—though largely blocked—foreign exchange reserves in London.
During this period Egypt's foreign exchange policies basically consisted in
responding to the ups and downs of world economic conditions as they mani-
fested themselves in the international markets for long staple cotton. Their
aim was to stabilize both the Egyptian balance of payments and the domestic
economy under the constraint set by the speed at which the British government
would agree to release Egyptian sterling reserves and convert them into U.S.
dollars. The phases of Egyptian exchange policies from the second half of the
forties to the beginning of the sixties thus tended to coincide with the phases
of the world economy.' During an international upswing, cotton prices and
export earnings generally increased, generating an upswing with tendencies
toward price increases in the domestic Egyptian economy. To stabilize the
economy the obvious policy was to relax whatever exchange controls might
have existed and to appreciate the domestic currency in an effort to dampen
export earnings, expand imports, and keep down domestic prices. Vice versa,
during a downswing in world business conditions, cotton prices and export
earnings declined and deflationary tendencies were transmitted to the domes-
tic economy. Stabilization now required tightened exchange controls and someINTRODUCTION XXXIII
measure of currency depreciation. Note that the aim of stabilizing domestic
prices and production went nicely hand in hand with that of stabilizing free
foreign exchange reserves.
It is along the lines of this paradigm that Chapters 2 and 3 attempt to
describe and analyze the Egyptian exchange regimes from World War II to
1961. During this long period the country was vacillating between what the
co-directors term Phases I, II, and V;2 the problem is to trace possible sub-
phases to understand these vacillations. To be fully understood, the Egyptian
exchange regimes have to be viewed as integral parts of general aggregative
stabilization policies, not merely as palliatives adopted to save a troublesome
exchange reserve situation or protect domestic industries. Their success was
rather limited; generally, they could be characterized as "too little and too late."
In 1962 the foreign exchange reserves were exhausted and Egypt entered
a period of permanent, severe foreign exchange crisis—as yet unresolved. A
devaluation with unification of exchange rates was undertaken in 1962 (as dis-
cussed in Chapter 4). In a sense, it could be said that here we have Phase
III, to use the co-directors' terminology: after fifteen years of fumbling with
foreign exchange regimes, the government finally decided to devalue overfly.
De facto, however, the devaluation was imposed upon the country by the
International Monetary Fund as a condition for obtaining short-term credits
in a critical situation, possibly in the hope that it might be an overture to liber-
alization in the conventional sense of the word. The Egyptian government
had not wanted to devalue—it saw no reason for it, and had no intention of
liberalizing trade and foreign exchange in any sense of the word. For by that
time, the fundamental institutional changes in Egyptian society alluded to
above were a faft accompli, rendering it difficult and, indeed, inappropriate to
pursue the analysis in terms of deviations from and approaches to free trade.
With the introduction of Arab socialism, foreign trade and financial trans-
actions became government prerogatives that were not going to be abolished
even if the economy, internally and externally, had been in a state of equili-
brium. Indeed, what were emergency controls before 1961 now became the
normal institutions of the country, and how the economy would work was
going to depend, inter alia, upon the rules for their operation. Refusing to
see anything but palliatives in such a system would be an absurdity, almost like
insisting that the communist system in the Soviet Union is really only an
expedient that would be superfluous if that country just pursued appropriate
demand management policies and introduced a realistic exchange rate! With
controls established as permanent institutions in a system dominated by the
public sector and by government ownership and decisions, the basis for their
evaluation should be above all how well they serve that particular system,
with its particular constraints on private economic activity and its particular
economic and social aims (as best as these can be identified).
It is along these lines that Chapter 5—and Parts Two and Three in theirXxxiv INTRODUCTION
entirety—attempt to appraise exchange regimes and domestic controls after
1961. Chapter 5 describes the situation after the nationalizations of that year
and the devaluation of 1962, focusing on the formal machinery of exchange
allocation. The motives for the actual allocations, apart from certain very
general principles, are hidden behind a wall of administrative secrecy which we
have not been able to penetrate (yet another reason why we have been com-
pelled to study directly the allocation of resources in Parts Two and Three).
Chapters 6 and 7 study cropping patterns in agriculture during the sixties.
An econometric technique was developed to measure the deviation of actual
crop acreages from optimal acreages, the portion of the deviation that can be
ascribed to price distortions, and the impact of direct government controls.
Generally, we find that, rather than neutralizing them, the direct controls have
added to the deviations from optimal cropping patterns that the price dis-
tortions alone would have created. Thus, on balance, far from improving the
situation in regard to efficiency in production, the direct acreage controls only
served to make it worse.
Chapters 8 to 10, comprising Part Three, analyze ten important manu-
facturing industries from the point of view of efficiency and international com-
petitiveness. Because the government—before 1961 with the participation of
private industry—attempted to broaden the industrial structure,it did not
concentrate investments in the most efficient, traditional industries. Hence, a
tendency to a relative decline in measured competitiveness is apparent over
the period. It may be partly explained by the emergence of infant industries,
but some long-term misallocation of investments clearly did take place. There
is no evidence that this went beyond the misallocation that would have oc-
curred in any case as a consequence of genuinely private investment decisions
made by private firms on the basis of price distortions created by the govern-
ment to provide adequate profits in inefficient industries. Before 1961, low
efficiency was, in fact, always accommodated by the necessary price distor-
tions. After 1961, inefficiency was reflected in low profits or losses, financed
by government subsidies, rather than in greater price distortion. Thus, it can
be argued that after 1961 there was less misallocation in respect to manu-
factured consumer goods in the sense that price distortion of consumption
patterns was reduced. Moreover, there was no automatic "resource pull" to
inefficient industries. These positive features may have been more than offset,
however, by shortages in consumer goods caused by trade controls and by
undue concentration of decisions at the ministerial level, severely disrupting
the incentive system at the plant level, misallocating labor, crippling its dis-
cipline, and generally creating a rather erratic pattern of trade and inventories.
Albeit some labor misallocation may have been adopted for the sake of
income redistribution, the latter can certainly not serve as an excuse for the
nepotism in hiring practices and personnel management prevailing over theINTRODUCTION XXXV
wholeperiod and aggravated after 1961. There is, on the other hand, little
evidence of production disruptions as a direct consequence of the exchange
regimes, although this circumstance is probably related to discrimination in
favor of the big, modern manufacturing industries, as discussed in Part Three.
It should be emphasized that our paradigms at best capture only the
most essential characteristics of Egyptian foreign exchange regimes. Actual
developments were more complex than that. Moreover, the aims of successive
governments were never clearly formulated, and more often than not policy
moves were badly prepared, poorly executed, and occasionally inconsistent.
In explaining our paradigms, we warned against considering the exchange re-
gimes as mere palliatives. To some extent, of course, they were just that. Thus,
both the Organization of Free Officers and, later, Nasser himself were obsessed
by the idea of the stability of the Egyptian pound—that is, of its official par
rate—as a symbol of the soundness of the economy and perhaps even of the
nation. (In all fairness, let it not be forgotten that this was conventional wis-
dom at that time, codified in the IMF.) When, during the fifties, exchange
regimes followed each other in rapid succession, they doubtless also served to
conceal the true nature of the policy pursued. And the resistance to the 1962
devaluation, not to mention the blunt refusal to devalue further in 1966, may
have been more a question of paying homage to the national (and inter-
national) symbol than the logical consequence of sponsoring an economic
system where prices serve to regulate income distribution rather than resource
allocation and where, for that reason, devaluation has a different role to play—
if it has a role to play at all—than within a conventional, private enterprise-
oriented liberalization program.
While we are fully aware of this aspect of Egyptian foreign exchange
policies, making it the focus of our analysis would be misleading. It would
tend to hide the real problem that the government was seeking to solve: the
administration of a mixed economy, dominated by the public sector, with na-
tionalized foreign trade. How to make such a system function efficiently is a
problem that socialist regimes in general and the Egyptian government in
particular have yet to solve.
NOTES
1. For a listing of specific phases in tracing the evolution of exchange control regimes,
delineated by the co-directors of the present series, Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne Krueger,
as an overall guide, see Appendix B, pp. 348—349.
2. See Appendix B, p. 349.